Jonathan Murphy provided a rejoinder to libertarians and anarchists about taxation not necessarily being theft, that in purely hypothetical terms may have some validity, but which is so non-existent in both past and present, and so close to being impossible that the entire exercise is one of futility, and therefore, dare i say, of pedantery?
Taxation is not inherently non-consensual. It can be agreed upon; it can be consented to. Let’s say a group of people get together and decide to pool their resources for some public good (let’s say, common defense). Depending on the structure of their arrangement, they all agree to provide some annual contribution to this goal. This is, in essence, taxation. Furthermore, it is consensual taxation.
Actually, this is not in essence taxation. It is only taxation in the case of a public good being provided by a government, which by definition has a monopoly of force in order to be called a government. Without a monopoly of force to ensure monopoly on the provision of this good, as well as a legal right to use force against people, the provider of this public good would merely be a private company. So not only would the case be that a group of people voluntarily pooled resrouces for a public good that is then provided by an organization; they would also have to voluntarily agree to that organization having a monopoly of coersion.
Even in the hypothetical case that this is a possibility, how often has this happened in history, and how likely is it to happen in the future? Bear in mind, we are speaking of total unanimity of all people in this group, for if any one person in this group is forced to contribute, taxation would become theft instantaneously. Now imagine the group consisting of millions upon millions of people.
But if taxation can be consensual, doesn’t the use of (or threat of) force for compliance necessarily mean that taxation isn’t consensual? Isn’t that evidence against my thesis? Again, not necessarily. Yes, the thief may use force to get what he wants, but even consensual agreements may carry a threat of force. Contracts contain provisions in case one person reneges on his deal. These are voluntary agreements that contain elements of force if certain conditions are not upheld. So, the existence of force is not in and of itself a sign that the agreement is involuntary.
Actually, any private company that establishes a renegging on contractual obligations on the part of clients, is not allowed to use any kind of force itself. It must delegate this task to a governmental organization. A government itself, does not delegate this, but claims for itself this right to use coersion. It does this by definition, or it could not be called a government.
Added to this point of the debate, are the clear and obvious facts that valid contracts are never signed by anyone to go into deals with governments (for conditions that valid contracts need to meet, read “The Problem with Political Authority,” by Michael Huemer). No valid agreements are ever made about the power differentials between taxpayers and government. The courts, which are tasked to apply validity or invalidity to agreements, and to settle disputes, are actually part of the very institution that is party to a dispute in such a case, and therefore clearly has a conflict of interest. Force is commonly applied to all non-consenting individuals as well, as well as to any descendent of those who may have consented, as if agreements are valid across generations even without the consent of later generations. Furthermore, governments routinely break the conditions of any so-called agreement they make with their clients (the tax payer), without legal consequences. Yet, force is still applied to tax payers to secure funds.
The way Murphy defines taxation, it is basically no more than a legitimate contractual obligation one has to any party one voluntarily enters into an agreement with. But just as we never call this “taxation” in the private sector, there would be no point whatsoever using this term in the public sector.
But we ARE using the term “taxation” in the public sector, and we do so for a reason. It is because taxation is NOT the same as a legitimate contractual obligation one has to any party one voluntarily enters into an agreement with. Taxation as a term, is no more than a euphemism for what is essentially no more than extortion, the kind of which we can expect from mob enforcers. They will provide “services” whether we like them or not. And while we do not have to make use of them, we most assuredly have to keep funding them, at the threat of physical force. A number of logically and/or morally invalid excuses are then called upon to justify this extortion, such as “the majority wants it,” or “outside of government nobody else can provide it,” or “this is the price you pay for civilization.”
Even if Jonathan Murphy very carefully constructed his logical argument that taxation ought not necessarily to be coersive (which he doesn’t), his argument would be so hypothetical, and have so many narrow conditions upon government, that it applies so little to actual history and reality that the entire argument is an exercise of futility and a waste of time. As a rejoinder to libertarians and anarchists, it is virtually meaningless.
The real question, the one we should be discussing and thinking on, is “what constitutes consent?” If governments “derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,” what constitutes consent? At what point does government “become destructive to these ends”?* Yes, this is the interesting question and one I will not be discussing in this post.
Gee, how convenient.
A quick aside on this point: using the same logic as above, it can be shown that merely being in a minority, losing an election, or not having things go your way in politics is not necessarily a sign of oppression or malfunctioning government.
Actually, using the same “logic” as above, it cannot be shown at all that being in a minority, losing an election, or not having things go your way in politics is not merely a sign of oppression or malfunctioning government.
Apparently, Murphy is either totally unaware or unsympathetic to the notion that any valid agreement or contract between parties can only exist when all parties enter into it voluntarily and consentually. In other words: when there is unanimous agreement by all parties involved. One does NOT enter validly into any agreement (and its conditions as well as consequences for failure to adhere) when simply a majority of others agree to the agreement. Just like a majority of women who want to partake in an orgy cannot determine that an unwilling woman should also be part of it, no majority of a people that want an agreement with a government can determine that those who do not should still enter into that agreement. Democracy is NOT a valid instrument for determining whether any one individual ought to enter into an agreement. Group rape does not become consentual just because a majority of participants agree to it.
So his entire claim that his “logic” led to this conclusion, is a non sequitur fallacy.
If Jonathan Murphy wants to write rejoinders to libertarians and anarchists, he really ought to stop coming up with the same non sequiturs that libertarians and anarchists have been dealing with for decades, even centuries already. He should start trying to understand basic logic about a premise logically leading to a valid conclusion. He should understand what constitutes a valid agreement or contract. He should understand what makes taxation, taxation and he should understand what makes government, government.
As long as he doesn’t, at least he should stop wasting our time.